The geopolitical game of quantum chess is intensifying. Last week, I watched as the Biden Administration announced sweeping new export controls on quantum technologies, signaling yet another escalation in what many tech policy experts are calling “the quantum cold war.” The restrictions specifically target hardware and software that could accelerate quantum computing capabilities in countries deemed potential security threats.
These measures arrive at a critical juncture in quantum technology development. Having covered this space for nearly five years at Epochedge, I’ve witnessed the transformation from theoretical physics discussions to practical computing realities that threaten to upend everything from encryption to drug discovery.
“We’re witnessing the balkanization of the quantum ecosystem,” explained Dr. Elena Markov, quantum policy researcher at MIT’s Digital Economy Initiative, during our conversation last month. “Countries are increasingly treating quantum capabilities as they once treated nuclear technology – as vital national security assets that must be protected at all costs.”
The new controls focus particularly on quantum processors exceeding 100 qubits, specialized cooling systems, and development software that could enable breakthroughs in quantum error correction – the holy grail that would unlock practical quantum computing. What makes these restrictions particularly significant is their breadth, covering not just hardware but the intellectual property that drives innovation.
For American quantum startups, the impact appears contradictory. While some welcome protection from international competition, others worry about losing access to global talent and collaborative research opportunities. When I spoke with quantum entrepreneurs at last month’s Q2B conference in San Francisco, the mood was decidedly mixed.
“These controls might protect us in the short term, but quantum physics doesn’t respect national boundaries,” said Jordan Chen, founder of QubitLogic, a quantum software startup. “The scientific talent is global. If we can’t collaborate internationally, we risk falling behind rather than pulling ahead.”
The history of export controls in technology offers cautionary tales. Similar restrictions on semiconductor technology in previous decades ultimately failed to prevent the globalization of chip manufacturing. The question isn’t whether quantum development will continue globally, but rather how these controls might reshape where and how breakthroughs occur.
What’s particularly striking is how these controls reflect a fundamental shift in how governments view technological innovation. The post-Cold War era of relatively open scientific exchange appears to be ending, replaced by what the National Bureau of Economic Research has termed “strategic technological sovereignty” – the idea that certain technologies are too valuable to share freely across borders.
The quantum computing landscape itself makes these controls particularly challenging to implement. Unlike traditional computing hardware, quantum technology remains in rapid flux, with multiple competing approaches from superconducting circuits to trapped ions. Controlling all potential paths to quantum advantage resembles trying to dam a river that constantly finds new channels.
Analysis from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology suggests that export controls are most effective when technologies have clear supply chains and limited alternative development pathways. Quantum computing, with its multiple technical approaches and fundamental basis in basic research, presents a particularly difficult case.
For global scientific collaboration, these controls represent a significant restructuring. “We’re already seeing research groups self-censoring and avoiding certain collaborations,” noted Dr. Wei Zhang of Stanford’s Quantum Science Initiative when I interviewed her for a previous article. “The chilling effect extends beyond the letter of the regulations.”
Industry analysts at Gartner predict that these controls will accelerate quantum development in countries like Canada, Australia, and parts of Europe that maintain strong research capabilities while existing outside the direct impact of these restrictions. We may be witnessing not the containment of quantum technology but rather its redistribution across new geopolitical lines.
For businesses and researchers navigating this new landscape, clarity remains elusive. The deliberately vague language in export control regulations creates compliance headaches while potentially driving talent toward environments with less regulatory uncertainty.
The economics of quantum computing further complicates this picture. With development costs reaching into billions of dollars, companies need access to global markets and investment to sustain research efforts. Restricting access to certain markets may make some quantum ventures financially unviable, potentially slowing overall development.
What seems certain is that we’re entering a new phase in how governments approach transformative technologies. The relative openness that characterized internet development appears unlikely to extend to quantum computing. For better or worse, quantum technology is developing in a world increasingly defined by technological competition rather than cooperation.
The challenge for policymakers will be finding the balance between legitimate security concerns and the open exchange that has historically driven scientific progress. For those of us covering this space, the coming years promise to reveal whether export controls ultimately secure technological advantages or simply redraw the map of where innovation happens.
