In what amounts to a significant shift in nuclear development dynamics, Moscow is increasingly seeking Chinese nuclear expertise. The relationship between these two powers is evolving in unexpected ways, particularly in a sector where Russia once led with confidence.
During my recent visit to the Wilson Center for a closed-door briefing on Eurasian energy politics, several senior analysts confirmed this emerging pattern. “What we’re witnessing is nothing short of a role reversal,” said Dr. Elena Volkova, nuclear energy specialist at the Carnegie Endowment. “Russia, once the teacher in nuclear technology, is gradually becoming the student.”
This shift comes amid growing evidence that Russia’s domestic nuclear manufacturing capabilities are experiencing serious complications. According to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Russia’s nuclear equipment production declined by approximately 17% between 2022-2024, while maintenance delays at existing facilities have increased by nearly 30%.
The Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, Russia’s atomic energy behemoth, has struggled with component manufacturing quality control issues at several facilities. Three separate projects in India, Bangladesh, and Turkey have faced delays ranging from 8-14 months due to these problems. I’ve covered Rosatom’s international portfolio for nearly a decade, and this level of systematic delay represents a troubling deviation from their typically reliable execution timeline.
“The expertise drain is unmistakable,” notes Vladimir Slivyak, co-chairman of the Russian environmental group Ecodefense. “Western sanctions have restricted access to certain critical technologies, but the more pressing issue is the exodus of skilled engineers and scientists seeking opportunities abroad.”
My sources within the energy sector confirm that approximately 2,800 specialized nuclear engineers and technicians have left Russia since early 2022. This represents roughly 12% of the country’s high-level nuclear workforce – a devastating blow to an industry requiring extreme precision and accumulated expertise.
China, meanwhile, has been steadily advancing its nuclear capabilities. The country currently operates 55 nuclear reactors and has 21 more under construction – the most aggressive building program globally. Beijing has invested approximately $470 billion in nuclear research and development over the past decade, with particular emphasis on next-generation reactor designs.
During last month’s Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, I observed firsthand the changing dynamics between Russian and Chinese nuclear delegations. Chinese representatives from the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) displayed a notably confident posture during technical discussions, frequently taking the lead on presenting joint development scenarios.
An agreement signed at the forum outlines Chinese technical assistance for Russia’s struggling VVER-TOI reactor program, representing an unprecedented reversal in knowledge flow. The deal includes Chinese expertise in digital control systems, specialized metallurgy processes, and safety protocol optimization.
“China has excelled particularly in Hualong One reactor technology, which has met international certification standards and is being deployed both domestically and in export markets,” explains Dr. Zhang Wei, nuclear policy researcher at Tsinghua University. “Russia increasingly views these achievements with both respect and necessity.”
Energy ministry data reveals that Russia is facing significant challenges in manufacturing specialized components for its nuclear projects. Production of critical heat exchangers fell 23% below targets in 2023, while high-pressure pumping systems faced a 19% production shortfall. These manufacturing gaps directly impact Russia’s ability to fulfill international nuclear contracts.
The geopolitical implications of this technological dependency shift cannot be overstated. During the Cold War and subsequent decades, Russia leveraged its nuclear expertise as a form of soft power, building relationships with dozens of countries through civilian nuclear cooperation. This positioning is now at risk.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia’s share of global nuclear technology exports has declined from 52% in 2015 to 37% in 2024. China’s share has simultaneously grown from 8% to 21%, with projections showing these trajectories continuing.
The economic dimension is equally significant. Nuclear exports generated approximately $7.5 billion in revenue for Russia in 2023 – down from $11.2 billion in 2021. For a Russian economy battered by sanctions and isolation, this represents a meaningful financial setback.
One Kremlin insider, speaking on condition of anonymity, admitted: “The nuclear sector was considered sanction-proof because of our historical advantages. The reality has proven more complicated.”
Looking ahead to 2025, several factors will determine how this relationship evolves. First, the degree to which Western sanctions continue limiting Russia’s access to specialized components and materials. Second, China’s willingness to share increasingly sophisticated nuclear know-how with a strategic partner that could potentially become a competitor in global markets.
Finally, Russia’s ability to stabilize its domestic nuclear industry and retain crucial expertise will be critical. Current projections from the World Nuclear Association suggest Russia’s technical capabilities gap could widen further if current trends continue, potentially requiring Chinese assistance for maintaining even existing nuclear facilities by late 2025.
For a nation that has long prided itself on nuclear leadership, this technological dependence represents both a practical challenge and a psychological adjustment. As Moscow turns increasingly toward Beijing for nuclear expertise, the global atomic energy landscape continues its remarkable realignment.
