I was sitting in a sleek San Francisco tech conference last November when an innocuous slide flashed across the giant screen—an American processor company touting its hardware’s “edge computing capabilities” with a Chinese partner. What the presenter didn’t mention was how those same chips now power facial recognition cameras dotting the streets of Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. That technological bridge between Silicon Valley innovation and authoritarian surveillance is no isolated incident, but rather emblematic of a troubling pattern I’ve been tracking for years.
American technology continues to serve as the backbone for China’s expanding surveillance apparatus, despite growing export controls and increased scrutiny. This complicated technological entanglement represents one of the most consequential and overlooked aspects of US-China relations heading into 2025.
“What we’re witnessing is a disturbing cycle where American innovation gets repurposed through various channels to enable precisely the systems we claim to oppose,” explains Maya Wang, associate director for China at Human Rights Watch, whom I spoke with last month. “The technology flows have slowed but not stopped.”
The surveillance ecosystem built within China has become a thriving export business, with infrastructure now deployed across more than 80 countries. The digital dragnet has grown particularly tight in Tibet, where authorities have implemented what researchers call the most sophisticated surveillance system outside Xinjiang.
During my investigation into this technological pipeline, I discovered that while some American firms have publicly distanced themselves from direct involvement, their components remain vital links in the supply chain. Advanced microprocessors, machine learning frameworks, and cloud architectures designed in American labs continue finding their way into Chinese surveillance applications through licensing agreements, third-country transfers, and other indirect routes.
The Boston University Surveillance Industry Index recently documented over 60 American firms whose technologies appear in Chinese surveillance systems. The relationship exists in several forms: component suppliers providing specialized chips, software developers creating underlying algorithms, and service providers offering cloud infrastructure.
“There’s a profound disconnect between the ethical guidelines these companies promote at home and the real-world applications of their technologies abroad,” notes Rebecca Fannin, author of “Silicon Dragon,” during our conversation at a recent tech policy forum. “Many executives genuinely don’t know—or prefer not to know—the end uses of their products.”
Efforts to control this technological flow face significant challenges. Export restrictions implemented since 2019 have created some barriers but contain numerous loopholes. The Commerce Department’s Entity List now includes several Chinese surveillance firms, yet their supply networks remain remarkably adaptive, often restructuring to maintain access to crucial American innovations.
The surveillance apparatus hasn’t just expanded—it’s evolved. Systems now incorporate predictive capabilities, attempting to flag potential dissent before it occurs. In Tibet, authorities deploy what they call “grid management”—a comprehensive monitoring system that divides communities into manageable sections with assigned officials and technological surveillance.
My sources within the tech industry describe increasing unease about these connections. One senior engineer at a major AI firm, speaking on condition of anonymity, told me, “We develop these capabilities for consumer convenience or business efficiency, but then watch them weaponized in ways that horrify us. The technical separation between beneficial and harmful applications is vanishingly small.”
This technological relationship extends beyond hardware. American research partnerships, academic exchanges, and joint ventures have inadvertently contributed expertise that strengthens surveillance capabilities. Several leading American universities maintain artificial intelligence research partnerships with Chinese institutions directly involved in developing surveillance tools.
The implications extend far beyond China’s borders. The surveillance architecture refined within China—built partially with American technology—is becoming a major export. Countries across Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia have purchased these systems, often through China’s Digital Silk Road initiative, effectively globalizing this model of technological control.
“We’re witnessing the construction of a worldwide surveillance infrastructure that undermines democratic values and human rights,” explains Xiao Qiang, research scientist at UC Berkeley’s School of Information, whom I interviewed earlier this year. “American technology firms must recognize their role in enabling or restraining this development.”
Looking ahead to 2025, several factors will shape this technological entanglement. Tightening export controls may restrict some flows, but technological diffusion continues through various channels. Meanwhile, China’s domestic alternatives are maturing rapidly, potentially reducing dependence on American inputs over time.
For American technology companies, the ethical questions grow more pressing. Corporate responsibility initiatives have expanded, but critics argue these efforts remain insufficient against the scale of the challenge. Shareholder activism has pushed some firms toward greater transparency regarding their global impact.
The path forward requires multi-faceted approaches. Enhanced export controls with fewer loopholes represent one avenue, while greater corporate responsibility frameworks offer another. Meanwhile, supporting open-source alternatives to surveillance technologies could provide communities tools for digital self-defense.
The technological decisions made in corporate boardrooms and research labs today will shape surveillance capabilities for years to come. As we approach 2025, the tension between innovation and control grows more acute, raising fundamental questions about the values embedded in our technological future.
What’s clear from my reporting is that the bright line many Americans imagine between our technological ecosystem and authoritarian surveillance systems doesn’t exist. Instead, we face a complex web of connections that demands greater attention, transparency, and action before the systems of surveillance become truly inescapable.
